Why cannot direct payments be capped in Slovakia? A political economy perspective

dc.contributor.authorPokrivčák, Ján
dc.contributor.authorTóth, Marián
dc.contributor.authorCiaian, Pavel
dc.contributor.authorBušík, Martin
dc.contributor.authorSvorenčík, Andrej
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-15T11:00:34Z
dc.date.available2021-03-15T11:00:34Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.description.abstract-translatedAnnually the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provides support to the farming sector amounting to more than EUR 50 billion in the EU, of which direct payments (DPs) take around 70%. DPs are often argued to be granted unfairly to large farms. In this paper we analyse implications and the political economy of DP capping in Slovakia in the context of the ongoing negations about the future CAP reform. The simulation results for Slovakia show that if the 2018 Commission proposal was approved it would lead to losses of EUR 190.1 million (68% of total DPs) to large farms when labour costs are not subtracted. These losses would decrease to only EUR 12.2 million (4.4% of total DPs) when the labour costs are subtracted. Further, the results show that potentially affected large farms in Slovakia show lower performance and lower compliance with the agricultural policy objectives than farms unaffected by the DP capping. Similar to the past CAP reforms, the position of Slovakia against DP capping is expected to be maintained also in future, which could be explained by three main factors: the productivity argument, the political economy argument linked to the lobby pressure from large farms and low economic distortions caused by Dps.en
dc.format24 s.cs
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationPOKRIVČÁK, J. TÓTH, M. CIAIAN, P. BUŠÍK, M. SVORENČÍK, A.Why cannot direct payments be capped in Slovakia? A political economy perspective. Prague Economic Papers, 2020, roč. 29, č. 6, s. 625-648. ISSN 1210-0455.cs
dc.identifier.document-number596002700001
dc.identifier.doi10.18267/j.pep.753
dc.identifier.issn1210-0455
dc.identifier.obd43932420
dc.identifier.uri2-s2.0-85096896088
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11025/42983
dc.language.isoenen
dc.project.IDGA19-18080S/Dodavatelsko-odběratelské řežezce v potravinářství: vliv koncentrace, nekalých obchodních praktik, politik a měnícího se chování spotřebitelůcs
dc.publisherVysoká škola ekonomickács
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPrague Economic Papersen
dc.rights© Vysoká škola ekonomickács
dc.rights.accessopenAccessen
dc.subject.translatedCAPen
dc.subject.translateddirect paymentsen
dc.subject.translatedcappingen
dc.subject.translatedpolitical economyen
dc.subject.translatedlarge farmsen
dc.subject.translatedSlovakiaen
dc.titleWhy cannot direct payments be capped in Slovakia? A political economy perspectiveen
dc.typečlánekcs
dc.typearticleen
dc.type.statusPeer-revieweden
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionen

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