An Authoritative Attitude to the Limits of Scientific Research

Abstract

In this paper, we defend the value free ideal (VFI) in the philosophy of science by extending Stephen John’s argument. We do so by showing that the methodological critique about VFI is unsatisfactory and offering an alternative solution by arguing that endorsing the so-called “non-epistemic value” is not the only solution for the uncertain connection between evidence and conclusions. We use the concept “research purposes” or “the purposes of having an individual scientific theory” as an approach to case analysis. We argue that although scientific hypotheses, especially policy-related ones, may not meet main social priorities (such as morality and social justice), and in some cases, will incur a huge social cost, the value judgments included in these hypotheses may not be an inappropriate non-epistemic value. Some of these value judgments can also be a preference for the epistemic value of knowledge based on the premise of maintaining scientific authority. As for the case studies put forward by many philosophers, it might be better to distinguish each case individually by each specific problem to understand whether it is due to the limits of scientific research at that time or some inappropriate value judgments in scientific reasoning per se.