

- HARTH, Dietrich (2003): Nationalphilologien – neue Philologie, in: WIERLACHER, Alois;
BOGNER, Andrea (eds.): *Handbuch interkulturelle Germanistik*. Stuttgart – Weimar: Metzler, s. 47–50.
- HESSE, Hermann (1986): Geleitwort zur japanischen Ausgabe der Gesammelten Schriften, in: MICHELS, Volker (ed.): *Materialien zu Hermann Hesses „Siddhartha“*. Bd 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, s. 258 ff.
- HOFMANN, Michael (2006): *Interkulturelle Literaturwissenschaft*. Paderborn: Fink.
- HRUBEC, Marek; ŠMAJS, Josef (2009): Světový filosofický kongres v Soulu: interkulturní obrat. *Filosofický časopis* 57 (2): 308–313.
- KIMMERLE, Heinz (2002): *Interkulturelle Philosophie*. Hamburg: Julius.
- KRISTEVA, Julia (1990): *Fremde sind wir uns selber*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- KRISTEVA, Julia (1996): *Slovo, dialog a román. Texty o sémiotice*. Praha: Sofis.
- KUČERA, Petr; PANUŠOVÁ, Marta (2002): Hermann Hesse: Siddhartha – zur ästhetischen Rezeption der Erzählung, in: LIMBERG, Michael (ed.): *Hermann Hesses Siddhartha*. 11. Internationales Hermann-Hesse-Kolloquium in Calw. Stuttgart: Staatsanzeiger-Verlag, s. 158–164.
- LEVINAS, Emmanuel (2005a): *Die Bedeutung und der Sinn*, in: LEVINAS, Emmanuel: *Humanismus des anderen Menschen*. Hamburg: Meiner, s. 9–59.
- LEVINAS, Emmanuel (2005b): *Intention, Ereignis und der Andere*, in: LEVINAS, Emmanuel: *Humanismus des anderen Menschen*. Hamburg: Meiner, s. 131–150.
- LOENHOFF, Jens (1992): *Interkulturelle Verständigung. Zum Problem grenzüberschreitender Kommunikation*. Opladen: Leske & Budrich.
- MACHOVEC, Milan (2006): *Smysl lidské existence*. Praha: Akropolis.
- MALL, Ram Adhar (1992): *Philosophie im Vergleich der Kulturen. Eine Einführung in die interkulturelle Philosophie*. Bremen: Universität Bremen.
- PATOČKA, Jan (1992): *Přirozený svět jako filosofický problém*. Praha: Československý spisovatel.
- PAUL, Gregor (2008): *Einführung in die Interkulturelle Philosophie*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- POLÁKOVÁ, Jolana (2008). *Smysl dialogu*. Praha: Vyšehrad.
- RUSTERHOLZ, Peter; SOLBACH, Andreas (eds.) (2007): *Schweitzer Literaturgeschichte*. Stuttgart – Weimar: Metzler.
- SCHOLZE, Dietrich (1998): *Stawizny serbskeho pismowstwa 1918–1945*. Budyšin: Domovina.
- STRUTZ, Johann (1992): Komparatistik regional – Venetien, Istrien, Kärnten, in: ZIMA, Peter V.: *Komparatistik. Einführung in die Vergleichende Literaturwissenschaft*. Tübingen: Francke, s. 294–331.
- TOURY, Gideon (1980): *In Search of the Theory of Translation*. Tel Aviv: University Press.
- VAJDA, György M. (1983): Einleitung, in: *Komparatistische Hefte* 7: 5–14.

Alemayehu Kumsa

Political Islam in Somalia 2009

Abstract:

The presented paper is divided into two parts. The first part tries to elucidate the origin of political Islam and its expansion in the Muslim World. The second part discusses the development of political Islam in contemporary Somalia.

The idea of Political Islam stems from the Koran, the Sunna, the Muslim history and sometimes from the elements of political movements outside Islam. The history of Political Islam is closely attached to the origin of Islam in which the Prophet Mohammad was the first political leader of the Muslim state; he was followed by his successors known as Caliphs (Imamate for Shi'ites). The principle of Political Islam is that state must be based on the Islam law or Shari'a; the duty of the rulers is to seek Shura, or consultation from their subjects and to recognize the importance of rebuking unjust rulers but not encouraging rebellion against them (Mortimer E., 1982:37).

Political movement in the Muslim World is labeled as "Islamic fundamentalism" in the West, but I prefer to use the phrase used in the Muslim World: "Political Islam." Professor Samir Amin defines political Islam as "political organization whose aim is the conquest of state power, nothing more, nothing less. Wrapping such organizations in the flag of Islam is simple, straightforward opportunism." (Samir A., 2001:3–6)

Modern concept of Political Islam originates in India, where it was invented and used by the Orientalists serving British colonialism. The phrase itself is taken over from Syed Abdul A'ala Mawdudi (1903–1979), a major 20th century Islamist thinker and the founder of Jamaat-e-Islam – the Islamic revivalist party in Pakistan (Zebiri K., 1998:167–8).

The Pakistani political Islamists struggled for the Idea of Muslim believers that they may live only under the rule of an Islamic state; this struggle resulted in the division of India into the main land India and Pakistan which took place in 1947. The partition of Bangladesh (Eastern Pakistan) from Western Pakistan showed that national identity which caused this separation of the two regions in 1971 is stronger than religious identity. Samir Amin interprets Political Islam as political organization that is not interested in the religion which it invokes, and that does not propose any theological or social critics. It is hostile (adversarial) to the liberation theology, and advocates submission – not emancipation (Samir A., 2002:3). Political Islam demands a complete cultural return to the public and private rules which were practiced two hundred years ago in Ottoman Empire, in Iran and in Central Asia by the then existing powers. Political Islam believes, or pretends to believe, that these rules are those of the “real Islam”, of the Islam existing at the time of the prophet. This is true, Islam permits this interpretation as legitimating the exercise of the power, as it has been used from Islam's origin up to modern time (Samir A., 2002:4). The demands of Political Islam to go back to the past are not exceptional: in order to sustain the structures of political and social powers in the pre-modern Europe, Christianity has been doing the same. Contemporary Islam is an ideology based on the past, an ideology which proposes a pure and simple return to the past, and, more precisely, to the period immediately preceding the submission of the Muslim world to the expansion of capitalism and Western domination. The Political Islam does not offer a precise program of what it would do when it takes over the power. Its answer to concrete questions of social and economic life is just an empty slogan: Islam is the solution.

Development of the Political Islam in the 20th century

One of the first Political Islamic movements is Salafism which originated in Saudi Arabia; it is based on the ideas of the radical theologian Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (Mamdani M., 2005:1).

Muhammad ibn ,Abd al-Wahhab an-Najdi (1703–1792) was an Islamic scholar born in Najd, in the present-day Saudi Arabia. Confessionists of this form of Islam do not call themselves Wahhabists, but Muwahhidun (“Unitarians” or unifiers of Islamic practices). They use Salafi Dawa or Ahlul Sunna Wal jama'a. The teaching of the reformer Abd-Al-Wahhab is more often referred to by its adherents as Salafi, that is “following the forefathers of Islam”.

In the opening decade of the nineteenth century, the Wahhabists and the House of Saudi dynasty formed an alliance commencing a state building project that

was completed a century later. The Saudi House and the Wahhabists agreed to glorify the Saudi tribal raids on the neighbouring oases by treating them as jihads, in return for King Muhammad bin Saudi's promise to make Wahhabism the state ideology. The state building and expansion of Wahhabism collapsed during the occupation of the kingdom by the Ottoman Empire in 1818. The Saudi kingdom was restored by means of a series of Wahhabi-anointed jihads in the 1910's and 1920's; on the 21st September 1932, the whole finally unified territory was declared an independent kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Ghassan S., 2000:763–65). The religious militia of King Saudi was given full support from the Wahhabists to unify the kingdom with air support of British who were occupying the Arabian Peninsula at that time. After World War II, the Americans replaced the British as the kingdom's main patron. When the Soviet Union intervened to Afghanistan in 1979, the then USA president Ronald Reagan used the Saudis as foils against them and Wahhabism was given the status of a liberation theology that would free the region of Communism (Mamdani M., 2005:2). The jihadist Islam was an ideology of marginal political significance in the late seventies, but in eighties the Reagan administration declared the Soviet Union to be an “evil empire” and set aside the common secular model of national liberation in favour of the international Islamic Jihad. Thanks to this cooperation the Afghan rebels could use the charities to recruit tens of thousands of volunteers and to create militarized madrassas (Islamic schools) that turned these volunteers into cadres. “Without the rallying causes of the jihad, the Afghan mujahideen would not have had neither the numbers, the training, the organization, nor the coherence or sense of missions that has since turned jihadist Islam into a global political force” (Mamdani M., 2005:6).

The second group of Political Islamists originated in Egypt in 1928; it was led by the Egyptian activist and school teacher Hasan al-Banna. The Sunni Muslim Brotherhood is one of the oldest and the largest, as well as the most influential Islamist organizations. The Muslim Brotherhood has its center in Egypt, though the group maintains branches throughout the Arab-Muslim world incl. Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (Hams), Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Sudan. The aim of this organization is based on the al-Banna's proclamation that Islam be “given hegemony over all matters of life.” The political program of the Muslim Brotherhood is to establish an Islamic Caliphate spanning the entire Muslim world. Its aspiration is to make Islamic (Shari'a) law the sole basis of jurisprudence and governance. The credo of the organization is “God is our objective, the Koran is our Constitution, the Prophet is our leader, struggle is our way, and death for the sake of God is the highest of our aspirations”.

The Muslim Brotherhood became strong in the forties of the last century and started challenging the authority of the monarchy. In 1948, the government of the Prime Minister Mahmoud Fahmi Nuqrashi dissolved the organization. The organization retaliated violently to the government decision and a Muslim Brotherhood member assassinated Nuqrashi. The government took similar action against the leader of the

organization by killing Hasan al-Banna in 1949 and an official crackdown was launched against the brotherhood.

When the military forces led by Gamal Abdel Nasser took over the political power by overthrowing the monarchy in 1952, the Muslim Brotherhood split into two factions – into gradualists and those who advocated armed revolution against the corrupted Middle Eastern regimes. The gradualists were led by Hasan al-Hudaybi, who preferred cooperation with the government to gradually move the country toward Islam. The radical faction was led by the writer and ideologue Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) who advocated armed revolution against the corrupted Arab regimes and more broadly against the unbelievers in the Western world. Qutb divided the world into “the party of Allah and the party of Satan”. The view of Qutb clashed with the military government of Egypt; as the result he was executed in 1966 on the charges of plotting to overthrow the Egyptian government. Qutb's ideas became inspiration for many radical Muslim organizations of the Muslim world.

History of Islam in the Horn of Africa is not new for the peoples of this region. When Prophet Mohammad started preaching the new religion, his disciples were persecuted by Qureysh tribe whose members were believers of tradition belief; they planned to kill the prophet but were afraid of blood-feud of his clan to which his family belonged. The people who converted to the new religion were humble folk unable to defend themselves against oppression. “So cruel was the persecution they endured that the prophet advised who could possibly contrive to do so to immigrate to a Christian country Abyssinia.” (Glorious Koran, 1953:XII).

The first group was sent secretly across the Red Sea in 615 C.E. and a large group followed it the next year. All in all, over 100 people left, representing a sizable proportion of the Muslims at the time, only two to three years after the Prophet began his public preaching. The embryonic Muslim community who was sent to Abyssinia included some important figures: Mummad's daughter Ruqayya, her husband Uthman (who would become the third Caliph), Muhammad's future wife Umm Habiba, and his cousin Jafar, the brother of Ali. The departures angered the Prophet's opponents who wanted to destroy the new religion; they sent their own delegation to the King of Abyssinia to give them the emigrants over. The King refused their demand and rendered these Prophet's closest people a shelter. The emigration of this Muslim community and the asylum offered to them by the Abyssinian King were often referred to in Hadith (the traditions associated with the prophet) as “the first and second hijiras to Abyssinia” (Robinson D., 2004:111). This migration took place six years before Mohammad moved to Medina in 622. After his arrival to Medina he requested the Abyssinian King to permit the return of the exiles, and the king complied quickly. The emigrants arrived to Medina in 628, with many gifts which the king gave them. One of those who came to Medina was Umm Habiba whose husband had converted to Christianity and stayed in Aksum. Umm Habiba had divorced from her husband and married the Prophet. According to another

Hadith, the Prophet gave Abyssinia a special and inviolable state of neutrality, the Dar al-Hiyyad. This tradition existed separately from Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, the basic dichotomy of the Islamic world, and put Abyssinia “off limits” of jihad. This tradition is also formulated in a saying attributed to Muhammad: “Leave the Abyssinians alone” (Robinson D., 2004:111–12).

This special status was given to Abyssinians because of the assistance they provided to the faithful at critical juncture of Islamic history. The Muslim respect for Abyssinia was kept until the 13th century when the small eastern Muslim states met in conflict with the expanding Abyssinian Kings.

Expansion of Abyssinia to the East and conflict with the neighbouring Muslim states

Before the era of Islam there were Arab traders on the western side of the Red Sea; according to the Somali legends, their nation originated in the connection of Oromo women and Arab men (Braukamper U., 2002:14). The expansion of Islam to the North East Africa started before the ninth century. Starting from the ninth century there were many states between the Red Sea and Abyssinia which accepted Islam as their own religion and fought against the Abyssinian expansion. One of the dominant states between Red Sea and Abyssinia from 1285 to 1415 was the state of Yifat which was conquered by the Ethiopian troops of Emperor Yeshak in 1415. The occupation of the capital of Yifat Zayila (Zeyila) by Ethiopian troops thus ended Yifat as political entity (Braukamper U., 2002:26).

During the rule of Emperor Amda Siyon I (r. 1314–1344) (Marcus H.G., 1994:19) the first important southward expansion of Christian settlement took place; Shawa (not to be confused with the contemporary province of Shawa in the central Ethiopia) was among the Muslim territories ravaged by the Ethiopians.

Emperor Yisshaq's victorious campaign to the coast of the Indian Ocean, which resulted in the conquest of Zayla, did not permanently interrupt the rise of Islamic kingdoms in the lowland of the Horn of Africa. The period between the thirteenth to half of the sixteenth century had been characterized by continuous wars between the lowland Muslim states and the highland Abyssinian Christian Kingdom. The policy of these two expansive groups culminated during the reign of Lebna Dengel (1508–1540) (Marcus H.G., 1994:29) when the Abyssinian troops invaded Adal and destroyed the castle of the sultan at a place called Zankar in which the Muslim commander was killed. During the humiliating defeat of Muslims a new leader arose in Adal: ibn Ibrahim al Ghazi (1506–1543) called Gagn (the left-handed), whose aim was to reconstitute Adalite political power in the lowland of the Horn of Africa and to embark on a conquest which brought three-quarters of the Christian empire under his control, “from Ahmad's spectacular victory over the Christians at Šembora Kure in 1529 until his final defeat and death at Wayna Daga near lake Tana 21 February 1543” (Henze P.B., 2001:88–89). Historically it was an international war: both fighting groups were supported by their foreign friends from other continents.

What concerns Abyssinia, the military support arrived when the majority of its territory was already conquered by Gagn: in February, 1541, 400 Portuguese well-armed Musket-eers under the command of Christovãrio da Gama, son of Vasco da Gama, landed in Mas-sawa. They brought great quantities of arms including canons, gunpowder, and other sup-plies and were accompanied by nearly 150 craftsmen, gunsmiths and slaves (Henze P.B., 2001:88). The Adal leader Gagn appealed to his Muslim co-religionists, Ottoman Turks, and "received 900 well-armed reinforcements from Yabid". However, Gagn, the great warrior, made a mistake when he thought that the war is over by sending the Turkish sol-diers home after he won victory in the late August of 1542: hundreds of Christian soldiers were killed, including almost two hundreds of Portuguese; their commander Christovãrio da Gama was captured and beheaded. In the battle, 168 from 400 Portuguese soldiers were killed and 12 were taken as war prisoners. The remaining 120 who survived the on-slaught reorganized themselves within the army of emperor Galadwos and on 26th Feb-ruary, 1543 finished the struggle by killing Ahmad Gagn.

The death of Gagn and his armies disintegration brought an end to the Mus-lim threat for Abyssinia, but the expansion of this empire continued until the beginning of the 20th century when the territory of the empire became three time larger than before and Abyssinian population made less than 30% of the people in the empire.

The recorded history informs us about the conflict between Abyssinia and Somalis during the rule of the Abyssinian King Yeshak who reigned from 1414 to 1429. The record is the victory song of the King over his enemies, and Somalis are one of the peoples whom the king fought (Lewis H., 1966:30).

One Somali author asserts that the struggle against the expansion of Ab-tyssinia resulted in the development of the Somali national consciousness: "In the past, these struggles took the form of jihads against the Christian rulers of the Abyssinian Highlands who were periodically sending raiding parties to the coastal Islamic states of the Horn. These struggles were particularly intensive during the sixteenth century." (Hussein A.A., 1983:32)

The modern conflict between the expansionist Ethiopia and Somali people started at the end of the 19th century when the Somali territory was occupied and divided into five colonial territories among Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, and Italy. In 1897, the colonialists signed treaty on the division of Somali territories (Lewis I.M., 2002:56–62). Somali territories which were colonized by three western European countries gained their independence in 1960 (Somalia) and in 1977 (Djibouti) but the territory colonized by Eth-opia has hitherto remained under colonial rule (Bulcha M., 1988:34). Anti-colonial move-ment started in 1899 as a movement of an organized group led by the name of Islam be-cause all the colonialists were Christian states. The organized movement of resistance was led by Muhammad Abdille Hassan (7. 4. 1864–1920) considered by the Somalis as the first nationalist hero of Somali nation; he was organizing his people not on the clan basis but in the name of Islam which unifies all the Somalis under one umbrella of religion (Cassanelli

L.V., 1982:249). This movement waged war against Ethiopia, British and Italian occupants for 21 years to eradicate the enemies from the Somali territory.

Contemporary Political Islam in Somalia

Islam is the official state religion of Somalia, and almost 100 percent of the Somali popu-lation are Sunni Muslims (cited by Rabasa A., 2009:29). In the pre-colonial Somalia, there existed two sources of law: the Somali customary law (xeer) and the Islam law (shari'a). If the two contradicted each other, customary law often prevailed. During the colonial period, British, French or Italian law were introduced according to the colonial territo-ries in which these three types of law were coexisting. The independence brought two territories together with different legal systems. The Italian colony was ruled by mix of Italian legal system, Somali custom law and Islamic shari'a. The British Somaliland was ruled by British legal system and both of the Somali legal systems.

On the 1st July, 1960 the British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland were uni-fied to form the Somali Republic. The first obstacle which the union faced was how to integrate two different systems of law, finance, administration and education inherited from Italy and Britain (Castagno A.A., 1966:546). Another problem which the demo-cratic government of Somalia (1960–1969) was unable to solve was which script it was to accept: the Arabic, Osmaniya script (invented by Osman Yusuf Kenadid in 1920), or a modified version of the Latin script. The military government led by General Sayyid Barre (1969–1991) solved the question in 1972 by selecting the modified Latin script as the official Somali script; this step contributed a lot to the development of the Somali language and to the emancipation of the people from illiteracy.

The formation of al-Itihaad al-Islaami

On the first anniversary of the military coup (October, 1970), the secular military gov-ernment proclaimed Scientific Socialism to be the sole ideology of the state. The sec-ular steps taken by the government clashed with the view of the conservative Islamic clerics. The main conflict has emerged when the new liberal law gave women the same inheritance rights as men (Marchal R., 2003:118). The government accused many reli-gious leaders preaching in the mosques against this liberal new law. Ten religious sheikhs were publicly executed in January, 1975, and twenty-three others received long prison sentences (Lewis I.M., 2002:213). The execution of these religious leaders has become a milestone for the formation of the underground resistance organizations operating in the name of Islam.

One of them was al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya which considered itself a Salafi (Wah-habist) society concentrated on "purification of the Faith"; there was nothing political about it, it was pure Da'wa (Da'wa is the religious mission of preaching and proselyt-izing). During the early 1980s, this Salafi movement entered into relations with Wah-dat al-Shabaab al Islaamiyya, a northern Somali Islamist group. Many of the leaders of

both these organizations became key figures in the formation of a new organization. The merger of the two organizations took place at some point between 1982 and 1984 and brought with it the new name: al-Itihaad al-Islaami (ICG, 100:3–4). The organization attracted many intellectuals (Záhořík J., 2008:80), mainly from the Somali National University, and asserted that Islam could not be separated from the politics. This was a bold challenge in the time when the Sayyid Barre's regime was weakening. The political aim of the organization was a typical Muslim Brothers' program as one of its former members put it: "Al-Itihaad offered an alternative to democracy, communism and man-made constitution. Koran and Sunna would be the basis for application of political, social and other aspects of life." (ICG, 100:4)

As quoted above, al-Itihaad al-Islaami has got a public political agenda and its leadership is known to include prominent commercial, political, and military figures throughout Somalia; the membership tends to be discreet, even clandestine, making it difficult to assess the organization's size and composition. The known members of its leadership are Sheikh Ga'ame in Puntland, Sheikh Ali Warsame in Somaliland, former army colonel Hassan Dahir Awey – chairman of the Islamic courts in Mogadishu; and Hassan Turki – a former military commander in Lower Juba (ICG, 45:16). Al-Itihaad propagates a puritanical, traditionalist (Salafi) version of the Islamic faith, a brand of Wahhabism. Since this is the theology of Saudi Arabia, most Somali view it as ideological import rather than indigenous affair. The Sufi Order is the dominant sect in Somalia and its leaders denounced al-Itihaad adherents as Saruuriyyin – disciples of Sheikh Mohamed Zain al-abidin Saruur, a Saudi religious dissident expelled from Saudi Arabia for his radical teachings. The first attempt of al-Itihaad al-Islaami to build its political power base took place in the southern town of Kismaayo but it was expelled from there by the United Somali Congress (USC) led by General Mohammed Farah Aidid in April 1991. The remaining fighters of al-Itihaad moved to the northern port of Bosaaso of Puntland to regroup in the area. The crushing military defeat in Kismaayo changed the attitude of the organization in that the success of the organization's religious mission be assured by taking arm; which means that from that time on the plan is not to preach the word of God, but to wage Jihad, i.e. "to take power by violence" (Marchal R., 2004:125)

Power struggle in Bosaaso

Bosaaso and its surroundings in the northeast Somalia are inhabited by Majeerten sub-clan of the Darood. One of the first organized armed movements during the struggle against General Sayyid Barre's government was the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) whose members were stemming principally from the Majeerten sub-clan; they fought to liberate the northeast region later called Puntland. The foundation of this front rooted in the failed military coup against Sayyid Barre's government which took place in 1978. Some military leaders who were involved in the coup escaped to Ethiopia and organized the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) led by the authoritarian

Colonel Yussuf Abdullahi (Prunier G., 1995:4). When the end of Sayyid Barre's government came on 27 January, 1991, he fled in a tank taking with him the gold and foreign currency reserves of the Central Bank, worth an estimated US \$27 million (Prunier G., 1995:6). The end of the dictatorial government of General Mohammad Sayyid Barre brought along the fragmentation of Somalia. The former British Somaliland declared its independence as Somaliland Republic on 18 May, 1991 (I.C.G., No. 66:6). The north-eastern region declared its autonomy as Puntland. The Puntland administration was led by the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF); al-Itihaad regrouped in the Bosaaso town after a devastating military setback in Kismaayo. With the tacit blessing of the SSDF chairman, General Mohamed Abshir Musa, al-Itihaad took control of strategic facilities across the Puntland, including Bosaaso port and hospital. In the vicinity of the town they also established a military base modelled on training facilities in Afghanistan.

In June 1991, al-Itihaad convened its first major conference since the collapse of the Sayyid Barre regime, under the chairmanship of Sheikh Ali Warsame. The conference restructured the movement into five divisions: the chairman of the movement and head of the political wing was Ali Warsame; his deputy, Colonel Hassan Dahir Aweys, was named the head of military wing; Sheikh Abdulqadir Ga'amy was assigned responsibility for the da'wa (ICG, 100:5). The financial sources of the movement were Bosaaso port taxes and contributions from international Islamic organizations such as the large Saudi charity, the Muslim World League (Rabitat al-Islam al-ālamīyya), and its subsidiary the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO). The existence of al-Itihaad approached its end when its members carried out two terrorist attacks in Bosaaso. In mid June 1992, al-Itihaad was expelled from the region by the SSDF and with military support from Ethiopia. The al-Itihaad members scattered to Ogaden in Ethiopia, to Somaliland (Rabasa A., 2009:54) and to Gedo region. Starting from August 1992, the al-Itihaad reorganized itself in Luuq – the capital of Gedo region, and controlled the administration of Gedo region for several years. It used Luuq as base to campaign against the Ethiopian targets inside the country. Al-Itihaad was an officially registered political party in Ethiopia, but it turned to attack civilian targets such as in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa where bomb blasts killed many civilians. When there is no rule of law, the authoritarian governments can kill anybody without any proof; a very good example can be the killing of three unarmed Oromo civilians in Addis Ababa accused of these bomb attacks in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa, meanwhile al-Itihaad took the responsibility for the bombing from Somalia (Hassen M., 2009:48). Finally, in January 1997, Ethiopia sent its army into Somalia and "many of Islamists – including foreigners – were killed or injured, the training camps were dismantled and al-Itihaad's short-lived terror campaign in Ethiopia came to an end. Officially, at least al-Itihaad al-Islaami both in Ethiopia and Somalia has ceased to exist." (ICG, 100:9)

The rise of the Islamic Courts Union

The first Islamic court was set up in northern Mogadishu, in the area of the Abgaal sub-clan of Hawiye, the Medina district of Mogadishu, by former members of the al-Itihaad splinter group, al-Ansar as-Sunna, in 1993; it was led by Sheikh Ali Dheere. Other courts were formed in western Mogadishu and other parts of the city in 1996 and in 1998. The former military colonel of Barre regime and al-Itihaad military wing leader Hassan Dahir Aweys established an Islamic Court known as Ifka Halane in Western Mogadishu, and another one in Marka, the principal town in lower Shebelle region.

The contribution of the Islamic Courts during the collapse of the state structure was that it brought Mogadishu from anarchy to relative order. The Shari'a courts played three roles: first, they organized a militia to apprehend criminals; second, they passed legal decisions in both civil and criminal cases; and third, they were responsible for the incarceration of convicted prisoners (Le Sage A., 2005:38).

The representatives of different Islamic courts formed the Assembly of the Courts. The Assembly of 63 members elected its chairman Ali Dheer, and Hassan Dahir Aweys was appointed secretary general. The council's primary functions included prisoner exchanges and occasional joint military operations, and provided security in most of the southern Somalia.

In 2004, a new umbrella organization was established for Mogadishu shari'a courts, which is called the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts of Somalia. The chairmen of ten courts either participated or named a representative. The Council members elected as its chairman Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed educated in Mogadishu, Libya, and Sudan and associated with Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a – a traditional Sufi association (Rabasa A., 2009:59) who is now the President of Somalia.

The Council of Islamic Courts faced unexpected group in 2006. This group was called the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT). It was composed of Somali warlords who were devastating the country from 1990 until that time, and "getting, according to our interviews with some members, about \$150,000 a month from Washington" (Prendergast J., & Fensen T. C., 2007:68). The interference of the foreign power in the Somali conflict built opposition block from the clan leaders to support the Islamic Court. From February to June, 2006 there was war between ARPCT and the Council of Islamic Courts; finally, ARPCT was defeated. The victorious Council of Islamic Courts gets support from the business community and from major public for enforcing public order. From June to December, 2006 the Union of Islamic Courts is able to control Southern Somalia. December 2006 will be remembered in the Somali history as a month of humiliation when historical neighbouring expansionist country occupied their country. All the time, Ethiopia wants either weak Somalia, or divided Somalia. In 1990s, Ethiopia supported one group against the others in the old colonial system "divide and weaken [Ethiopia desires neither a unified nor a stable Somalia (ICG. 45, 2002:9)]. When Somali clan leaders, intellectuals, and women supported by UN, AU, EU, Arab League, EGAD

and US formed a Transitional National Government (T.N.G.) at Arta conference in Djibouti in January – August, 2000 (Lewis I.M., 2002:291–96) which would lead the country for three years, Ethiopian government organized a conference of warlords to oppose the Transitional National Government. These warlords held a conference in Awassa town in Southern Ethiopia and formed the so called Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council led by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf. International Crisis Group wrote at the beginning of 2002: "Ethiopia has been funneling arms and money to the latter [SRRC], raising the possibility of renewed fighting on a much larger scale than the region has seen in a decade" (I.C.G.45, 2002:7). This group gradually paralyzed the Transitional National Government and became an alternative to the government.

The Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) organized a peace conference starting from 2002 for two years in Kenya and facilitated by external mediators (Kenyan government officials, with close support from IGAD, the UN, and the European Commission). The election of the president showed the Ethiopian government's target to bring Abdullahi Yusuf to power. Prof. Ken Menkhaus, who is expert on contemporary Somalia, was at the conference as researcher and observed that "the votes of parliamentarians had been purchased with Ethiopian government money. The going rate for an MP's vote was said to range from \$3,000 to \$5,000" (Menkhaus K., 2007:361). Abdullahi Yusuf is from the Majeerten sub-clan of Daarod from Northeastern Somalia (Puntland). The region of Mogadishu area is inhabited by Hawiye clan, which had very negative experience of Mohammed Sayyid Barre dictatorial administration whom they consider as Daarod dictator. When the information of Abdullahi Yusuf election reached Mogadishu, many thousands of people demonstrated against his 'election'. The negative attitude of Mogadishu people forced the new government to settle in Baidoa – a small town near the Ethiopian border. President Yusuf applied for UN and AU to send him 20,000 soldiers to force the people to accept him. Finally his king-making patron Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia sent 40,000 soldiers in December 2006 to Mogadishu to fight the Islamic Courts Union. The militia of Islamic Courts Union was not able to face such a huge army, and consequently changed their tactic to the guerrilla war. After the Islamic Court Union militias "went to the forest", Abdullahi Yusuf – as a puppet of Ethiopia – flew by Ethiopian helicopter to Mogadishu. The US government also miscalculated when supporting the Ethiopian government policy toward Somalia: led by information given to them from Ethiopia, they provided air support bombarding three times many areas in Southern Somalia and killing many civilians.

Human Right Watch reported the situation in its research result published on December 8, 2008 with a title "So Much to Fear". Let us quote from the report: "The young man and his family were members of a minority clan that traces its ancestry partly back to immigrants from Portugal and so were unusually light skinned. The Ethiopian soldiers began joking the young man's two sisters and mother looked more like Eritreans than Somali. With family's father lying dead on the floor in front of them several

Ethiopian soldiers took turn raping the three women.' And I was sitting there helpless,' the young man said. 'They started raping my sisters and they were screaming. They were there almost three hours. I saw them raping my mother in front of me... I could not help my mother or help my sisters'. At his mother's insistence he left Mogadishu the next day" (HMW, 8.12.2008:33). During the Ethiopian occupation 16,000 people were killed in Somalia. The Ethiopian army also lost many of its soldiers and was forced to withdraw.

The new government of Somalia led by President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed

From the very beginning, the government led by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf was the stooge of Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and the collaboration of Meles and Abdullahi brought one of the worst human catastrophes to Somalia (Samatar A.I., 2007:4).

Let me bring a Somali proverb what Meles forgot to remember though he lived for many years in Somalia when he was a Tigrai guerrilla leader of Tigrai People Liberation Front (TPLF) and traveled with Somali passport. One proverb says: "If you love a person, love him moderately, for you do not know whether you will hate him one day; on the other hand, if you hate someone, hate him moderately, too; for you do not know whether you will love him one day". Even more succinct is the Somali proverb illustrating how the Somali people unite when the external enemy comes to them:

I and my clan against world.
I and my brother against the clan.
I against my brother. (Cassanelli L.V., 1982:21)

The Ethiopian army occupation of Somalia unified the Somalis against this external enemy as Brian Smith correctly expressed in his article: "succeeded in uniting Somalia's various Islamic and clan-based militias against it" (Brian S., 25.3.2009). The unified Somali fighters forced Abdullahi Yusuf to resign from the post of presidency and open the way for the formation of new parliament which was comprised of Djibouti based Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) and the existing parliament. In February of this year, the new parliament elected new president – the chairman of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Sheik Sharif is from Hawiye clan of Mogadishu area and he named as Prime Minister the son of the former president of Somalia from Daarod clan who was assassinated in 1969.

After the departure of Ethiopian army from Somalia the united forces against the external enemy started to fragment.

One of the new regrouped organizations is called Hizbul Islam (Party of Islam) and it is led by Omar Imam Abubaker, who was deputy chairman to Aweys in the UIC parliament in 2006.

The President declared that he is ready to speak to all the Somali groups including Al Shaaba to be included into the government; it is maybe a new era for the So-

malis to build their new state depending on their political culture of building from the grassroots up to the federal state.

Electronic quotations

Wahhabi: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/wahhabi.htm> Accessed, 1.5.2009

Muslim Brotherhood: (<http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/groupProfile.asp?gpid=6386> Accessed, 1.5.2009

Bibliography

ADAM Hussein M. Language, National Consciousness and Identity –the Somali experience. In Nationalism & Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa. Edited by Lewis M. I., Ithaca Press, London 1983.

BRAUKÄMPER Ulrich, 2002. Islamic History and Culture in Southern Ethiopia: Collected Essays. Munster-Hamburg: LIT VERLAG.

BULCHA, MEKURIA, 1988. Flight and Integration. Causes of Mass Exodus from Ethiopia and problems of Integration in the Sudan. Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala.

CASSANELLI L.V., 1982. The Shaping of Somali Society. Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600–1900. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia.

EZEKIEL Gebisa (ed.) 2009. Contested Terrain: Essays on Oromo Studies, Ethiopianist Discourse, and Politically Engaged Scholarship. Red Sea Press, Inc. Trenton, NJ & Asmara, Eritrea.

GHASSAN Salame, 2000. Saúdská Arábie. In Oxfordský Slovník Světové Politiky. Sestavil Joel Krieger, Ottovo Nakladatelství, Praha. str. 763–65.

HENZE Paul B. 2001. Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia. Hurst & Company, London.

International Crisis Group, 2002. Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failing State. Africa Report No. 45, Nairobi/Brussels.

International Crisis Group, 2003. Somaliland: Democratisation and its Discontents. ICG Africa Report No. 66, Nairobi/Brussels.

International Crisis Group, 2005. Somalia's Islam. Africa Report No. 100, Nairobi/Brussels.

LE SAGE Andre, 2005. Stateless Justice in Somalia Formal and Informal Rule of Law. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Geneva, Switzerland.

LEWIS Herbert S., 1966. The Origins of the Galla and Somali. The Journal of African History, Vol.VII, 1. pp.27–46

LEWIS I. M., 2002. A Modern History of the Somali. Revised, Updated & Expanded. James Currey, Oxford.

MAMDANI Mahmood, 2005. Whither Political Islam? Review Essay. Foreign Affairs. January/February.

MARCUS Harold G., 1994. A History of Ethiopia. University of California Press.

MARCHAL Roland, 2003. Islamic Political dynamics in Somali Civil War. In Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa. De Waal Alex editor. Shama Books, Addis Ababa

MENKHAUS Ken, 2007. The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts. African Affairs, 106/204, 357–390.

MORTIMER, Edward, 1982. Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam, Vintage Books.

PRUNIER Gérard, 1995. Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and withdrawal 1990–1995 (July 1995) <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/writenet/wrisom.htm>. accessed 4.4.2001

RABASA Angel, 2009. Radical Islam in East Africa. Rand Project Air Force. Santa Monica, CA. USA

ROBINSON D., 2004. Muslim Societies in African History. Cambridge University Press, UK.

SAMATAR Abdi Ismail 2007. Warlordism, Ethiopian invasion, Dictatorship, & America's Role. <http://www>.

thirdworldtraveler.com/Africa/Somalia_America's_Role.html. Accessed 1.5.2009

SAMIR Amir, 2001. Political Islam. Convert Action Quarterly, No. 71 Winter.

So Much Fear 8.12. 2008. Human Right Watch. <http://hrw.org/reports/2008/12/08/so-much-fear?print> Accessed 12.12.2008.

The Meaning of the Glorious Koran. An Explanatory Translation by Mohammed Marmaduke

PICKTHALL, 1953. A Mentor Book.

TRIMINGHAM Spencer J., 1952. Islam in Ethiopia. Oxford University Press. London.

ZÁHORŤK Jan, 2008. Somalia in Conflict and Disorder: Internal and External Factors. In Middle East in the Contemporary World 2008. Edited by Bouchal M., Křížek D., Schmergl Z., Adela Publishing, Plzeň

ZEBIRI, Kate 1998. Review of Maududi and the making of Islamic fundamentalism.

Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 61, No. 1. Hamburg: LIT, Germany.

Roman Míčka

G. K. Chesterton jako „Defensor Fidei“

„Církev však není hnutí, ale místo setkávání, zkušební místo pro všechny pravdy světa.“

[CHESTERTON, Gilbert Keith, 1926].

„Církev je dům se stěm bran a žádní dva lidé nevstupují dovnitř zcela stejně.“

„Stát se katolíkem neznamená zanechat myšlení, ale naučit se jak myslet.“

„Esenci a zdravým jádrem této civilizace je filosofie katolické církve.“

[CHESTERTON, Gilbert Keith, 2006, s. 38, 106, 102].

Abstract:

The paper by Roman Míčka called «G. K. Chesterton as a Defensor Fidei» tries to place Chesterton's work into the context of theological and apologetical thought and especially into the context of Christian spirituality in its first part. It tries to describe and reflect specifics of Chesterton's religious attitudes and experience of faith. Besides the accent on practical sense and virtuous life his spirituality is distinguished by great friendship to the world, toleration to controversial historic dramas of Christianity and acknowledgement of the value of sensual world. It is a spirituality of joy and sensuality, friendly attitude to enjoyment. By this Chesterton represents an «antimystical» and an «antiascetical» tradition in the context of Catholic Christianity.

The second part of the paper is focused on Chesterton's book *The Catholic Church and Conversion* [1926] which is less known in the Czech background. The book is placed into the context of other Chesterton's apologetical works and the paper accesses and reflects fundamental ideas of the book, especially those referring to the character of Catholicism. There are accessed and reflected Chesterton's opinions concerning the position of Catholicism in the context of other Christian denominations and its future perspectives, Chesterton's conception of Catholic tradition and relation to religious truth, the question of Catholic accenting particular truths in specific historic contexts, when Chesterton presents Catholicism as an essence of reason and liberty. The end of the paper evaluates the historical meaning of G. K. Chesterton in the area of theological thought.